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Finkin: Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment)

ARTICLES
SHORING UP THE CITADEL (AT-WILL

EMPLOYMENT)t
Matthew W. Finkin*
In 2002, the American Law Institute announced a project to restate
the law of employment: not all of the law-so weltered has it become by
a thick network of hundreds upon hundreds of state statutes, some
sweeping, some of exquisite narrowness-but only the comer occupied
by the common law, of contract and tort, and not even all of that, not
defamation, misrepresentation (by employers or employees, intentionally
or negligently), negligent hiring or supervision, the intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress, but only parts of it, the two
most salient being the common law of job security and privacy.
I found the project puzzling for the Institute had breathed no public
hint of why these discrete choices were made or, more importantly, what
end called for the effort.1 My puzzlement was compounded when the
first albeit decidedly rough draft of the part on job security appeared.
After touching upon what seemed the draft's more problematic elements,
two questions persisted: "What purpose
does all this serve? What
2
demonstrable need does it satisfyr
Now the redraft of that part has appeared, this time accompanied by

t Indebt to William Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 791 (1965), and William Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
* Albert J. Harno and Edward W. Cleary Chair in Law and Director of the Program in Comparative
Labor and Employment Law & Policy, University of Illinois. The substance of these remarks were
delivered at the Twenty-Third Carl A. Warns, Jr. Labor and Employment Law Institute at the
University of Louisville (June 8, 2006) and to the Labor Law Trust Group Conference in Saratoga
Springs, New York (June 27, 2006). 1 am indebted to the many helpful comments I received on
both occasions and to Robert A. Gorman for comment on the penultimate draft.
1. Matthew W. Finkin, Law Reform American Style: Thoughts on a Restatement of the Law
of Employment, 18 LAB. LAW. 405, 409 (2003).
2. Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 298 (2005).
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a statement by the Institute's Director that provides at least a partial
response. "Employment law," he tells us, "is an excellent subject for
Restatement work.",3 We are not told why. Instead we are told that
although there is a good deal of legislation, federal and state, and
"important" legislation at that, nevertheless,
major aspects continue to be governed by law developed by state
appellate courts. Doctrine has changed significantly in recent decades.
Clarification,simplification, and adaptation
4 to social conditions are all
needed. A Restatement will be influential.

The Director's statement harkens back to the very origins of the
Restatement process. The ALI was created, as the 1923 Charter put it,
"to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs . .

,

Ever since, the jurisprudential-and

political-underpinnings of the process have been controversial.6
Should, for example, the aim of law reform be to cut down uncertainty
and complexity? One might think it self-evident that they were
unavoidable and, indeed, vital to any adjustment of the innumerable
new and changing spheres of interaction between human beings. The

"causes" of uncertainty and complexity which the [1923] Report deals
with in some detail undoubtedly exist; but to believe, as the Committee

did, that the answer to legal problems was simply to eliminate these
causes, leaves far too much unsaid. We must plan but we must plan not
in terms of the traditional legal dogma but with reference to social
values and objectives which we can test and weigh impartially, without
relying on a superstitious and unconfirmed belief in their validity. And
to say this, of course, is not to say anything startlingly new: it is merely
to draw on the sum total of social, political, scientific and legal thought

3. Lance Liebman, Forewordto RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW
(Discussion Draft 2006).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. American Law Institute, Certificate of Incorporation, (February 23, 1923), available at
http://www.ali.org/ (follow "Charter, Bylaws, & Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Certificate of
Incorporation" hyperlink); HERBERT GOODRICH & PAUL WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE, 1923-1961, at 7 (1961) (noting the history behind the Charter's adoption). The
American Law Institute's 1923 Report, observing "general dissatisfaction with the administration of

justice," and forming the foundation for the Charter, is set out in Report of the Committee on the
Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the
Establishmentof an American Law Institute, I A.L.I. PROC. PT. 1 (1923).
6. See Kristen Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons From the Restatement Movement,

33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 423, 440 (2004) (considering whether the Restatements have become
politically biased).
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over the centuries.

7

This Article will address the question, the answer to which is
assumed in the Director's statement, of whether these aspects of
employment law are a fit subject for Restatement. To do so, we will
need to engage with that process, not in the abstract, but in terms of the
product we have been given, of its basic tendency. This requires that we
take up the structure and elements of the two major portions of the
redraft that emerge with clarity now that some of the questionable
elements in the earlier effort have been eliminated or softened8 :
contractual job security and retaliation for a reason violative of public
policy. These will be measured against the benchmarks we have now
been given: of legal simplification, of doctrinal clarification, and of
adaptation to social conditions. Only after we see how the process is
shaping up can we ask whether we are likely to be well served by it
should it prove as influential as its proponents expect.
I.

CONTRACTUAL JOB SECURITY

The draft opens with a restatement of the "at will" employment rule
as "well established," 9 as it surely is, both as a default rule absent
agreement to the contrary and, more controversially today, as a judicial
self-denying ordinance on the imposition of any common law limit on
the employer's power to discharge; in the oft repeated nineteenthcentury formula, to affirm the employer's power to discharge for "any
reason, no reason, or even a morally repugnant reason." In this the draft
is quite right: the courts do repeat the formula, in opinion upon opinion,
but perhaps a bit less robustly than a century ago, for the recitation is
today usually prefatory to the further statement that there is a body of
exceptions to the rule which the case at hand customarily seeks either to
fit or to expand.

Having established the default rule, the draft next sets out four
limits on the power of summary discharge, by (a) a collective agreement;

7. Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. REv. 795,
797 (1959).
8. Gone from this version is the counter-factual assertion that the employer's ability to
discharge for any reason, even a morally repugnant one, "best represents the joint intentions of [both
of] the parties." Gone is the draft's extraordinary, counter-historical assertion that the theory of
contract "implied in fact"
is wanting in any sound doctrinal grounding. Gone is the endorsement of
employer good faith as the touchstone governing the definition of cause to dismiss under employer
rules affording job security. And promissory estoppel now makes an appearance, but, inexplicably,
only in the commentary and even then only passingly. See infra note 50.
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.01 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006).
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(b) a bilateral agreement; (c) a "unilateral employer commitment," and;
(d) a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The first is beyond the
Restatement's scope. Not so the rest.
The critical sections of interest here, (b) and (c), erect a wall of
separation between a bilateral contract and what the draft terms a
"unilateral commitment." At first blush, section (c) would seem to refer
to a unilateral contract, in doctrinal counterpoint to a bilateral contract
treated in section (b). The reader could well assume as much by the
comment introducing this section:
Agreements may provide for other than at-will employment. This
Section lists the various forms such agreements may take. Although

other established contract doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, also
may be applicable, an attempt has been made here to set out the
principalcontractualvariations from at-will employment.' °

But, as the draft proceeds we learn that a unilateral commitment is
not a unilateral contract; and in fact, that the draft rejects any theory of
unilateral contract as at all applicable to unilaterally promulgated
employer commitments-offering instead a theory of "employer
estoppel."' 1 More on that in a moment.
The reason the draft draws this distinction lies in the disparate
effect it gives to each of the respective guarantees. When a commitment
not to be dismissed except for just cause is contained in a bilateral
contract it cannot be abrogated by the employer; but when the same
commitment is contained in an employer policy applicable to the
workforce generally, it can be abrogated vis-d-vis those currently
governed by it.
An exception to this rule is carved out for those unilateral
commitments that have "vested"; but vesting, we are told, occurs only
"occasionally." 12 The sole example given is a welfare benefit, such as
severance pay, that does not vest under federal benefits law but might as13
a matter of contract-or, one might add, of promissory estoppel.
However, job security is not contemplated as meet for even so unusual
an exemption.
Two justifications are offered for the distinction between bilateral
agreements and unilateral commitments: the first doctrinal, the second
prudential. Let us turn first to doctrine.

10.

Id. § 3.02 cmt. a (emphasis added).

11. I d. § 3.04.
12. Id. § 3.05.

13.

Id.
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A. DoctrinalGrounds
The doctrinal distinction between a bilateral contract and a
unilateral one-the distinction the draft eschews-is that the former
contemplates an exchange of promises, one being consideration for the
other, the latter contemplates the doing of the act requested as
performing the dual function of acceptance and consideration, e.g., by
starting work on the terms expressly or implicitly offered without any
words of promise having been uttered by the employee.1 4 Not
surprisingly, most of the courts that have held employers to be bound by
the rules governing their working forces, including the rules affording
job security, have done so as a matter of unilateral contract.15 But at this
point, the draft tells us that contract doctrine is "often analytically
unsatisfying" because it would seem to require actual employee
knowledge of the rule in order to find assent to it.' 6 Where an individual
worker is not personally aware of the policy, or where the policy has not
been "closely studied," it could not be binding as to that worker.' 7 If
that is so, the doctrine of unilateral contract would render an employer
bound by its policy on job security vis-A-vis the studious employee, but
not the ignorant one. In order to proceed along this path, however, the
draft ignores doctrine of long-standing that would avoid the conundrum
either by imputing knowledge to the workforce constructively' 8 or by
similar reliance on the law of custom and usage.19 Instead, the draft opts
for abrogability, not as driven by unilateral contract, but by drawing
upon two public law analogies. The first is to tariffs filed with a
regulatory agency that bind the seller of goods or services until modified
tariffs are filed and approved.2 0 Essentially, the draft would connect a
regulatory device deployed to insure against a seller's price
discrimination in the market to the ability of an employer retroactively to
abrogate its commitment to discharge its incumbent complement of
employees only for just cause. The connection is less than pellucid.2

14. The distinction, Alan Farnsworth said a generation ago, "plays a less important role in
contemporary analysis of contracts" and, in fact, was abandoned in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4, at 110 (1982).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cf( C. B. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 208(d), at
652-53 & n.15 (1913).
19. Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratizationof Work: Employer Policies and Contract
Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 733, 747-48 n.68 (1986).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).
21. The Reporter's Comments draw attention to the use of this analogy by the United States
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The second and more important analogy is to what the draft terms
"administrative estoppel," i.e., by reference to "rules of practice
promulgated by administrative agencies to govern their operational
decisions; as a matter of administrative law, such rules are treated as
giving rise to a type of administrative estoppel and are held binding on
the agency even though no statute or regulation requires their
promulgation., 22 The draft references Vitarelli v. Seaton2 3 and other
related cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the 1950s.24
Because the analogy is critical to the draft's categorical distinction,
it need be treated in depth. This digression will be connected to the
larger analysis in due course.
1. Administrative Estoppel
Let us turn to the leading decisional ground. Vitarelli, a Ph.D. from
Columbia University, had for two years been a Training Specialist
employed by the Department of the Interior to work in Palau, a Pacific
Trust Territory.
He was suspended on suspicion of "sympathetic
association" with the Communist Party or with those in sympathy with
it.26 He was an at-will employee, but the Secretary of the Interior had
adopted rules providing for due process in the termination of an
employee when the grounds asserted concerned national security.27
These the Secretary flouted: Vitarelli was questioned on what the
government's agents took to be his unacceptable views on the rights of
Jews and blacks, of whether he had voted for Norman Thomas or Henry
Supreme Court in JI. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944), in struggling with the legal
nature of a collective agreement. That question was novel at the time, and perhaps, is challenging
still. See generally David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61
CAL. L. REV. 663 passim (1973) (arguing that American law has never developed a definite theory
on the rights created by a collective bargaining agreement). The provisions of a collective
agreement terminate at the agreement's termination unless the parties have agreed to the contrary.
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 US. 190, 209 (1991). But even as a provision assuring just
cause to discharge may expire upon the agreement's expiration, job security remains a mandatory
bargaining subject that an employer must negotiate with the union and cannot act upon unilaterally
until that bargaining obligation is exhausted. It is doubtful, to put it mildly, that having bargained to
impasse with a union, the employer would be free unilaterally to implement a demand for
employees to be placed on an at-will basis, i.e., for standardless and unfettered discretion in the
matter of discharge.

See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATrHEW W. FINKIN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR

LAW § 21.9, at 711 (2d ed. 2004).
22.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).

23.

359 U.S. 535 (1959).

24.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).

25. Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 536.
26. Id. at 536-37.
27. Id. at 538.
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Wallace, of whether he supported the United Nations, and a good deal
more-and was then dismissed.28 His dismissal was held to be of no
legal effect for want of the provision of a fair hearing as required by the
rules. 29 Even though the Department was not obligated to afford him a
fair hearing, it was bound by the rules it had adopted that did afford him
that protection.30
So far, so good. But we are offered the case for the follow-on
proposition that the Secretary could abrogate those hearing rules and
proceed thereafter to discharge another incumbent employee suspected
of disfavored political sympathies without affording any hearing at all.
This is the analogy the draft draws: that a private employer is bound by
its "rules of practice," just as a public employer is, but like a public
employer, the private employer is bound only for so long as it chooses to
be.3 1 It follows that a private sector employee can no more claim a
vested right in her employer's rule of practice, its "merely procedural"
rules, than can a public employee.32
There is no doubt that the doctrine of administrative estoppel, as
formulated in the 1950s, remains good law today; but there is good
reason to doubt that, today, a public employer's policy or practice that
assures that an employee will be dismissed only for good cause (not only
in those words, but perhaps even by such assurances of fair treatment or
progressive discipline as would amount to the same thing) 33 can be made

revocable vis-A-vis the incumbent workforce by the expedient of
labeling that commitment as a mere "rule of practice" or "agency
procedure." It is important to note, just as the Court did, that Dr.
Vitarelli's job was held at-will-nothing in the rules of the agency
adopted to deal with security risks was alleged or even thought to alter
that status.34 Nor even as to its incumbent complement of tenured
employees is an agency bound in perpetuity by its extant rules governing
standards of performance or evaluation: these have been considered to
be procedural incidents of employment.3 5 But a public employer's
underlying commitment to dismiss only for just cause-the commitment
actually addressed by the draft-would scarcely be abrogable as such a
28. Id. at 542-43 n.5.
29. Id. at 545,
30. Id. at 545-46.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).
32. See, e.g., Johnson v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 15 P.3d 309, 313 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
33. See Butterfield v. Citibank of S.D., N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D. 1989).
34. Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 539.
35. Johnson, 15 P.3d at 310, 313 (the addition of a system of post-tenure review to incumbent
tenured faculty imposed no retroactive disability inasmuch as the requirement of just cause for
dismissal was not affected in any way).
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procedural incident.
More than a decade after Vitarelli, the Supreme Court made clear
that a state employee's right to continue in his or her position, requiring
the observance of procedural due process in order to dismiss as a matter
of constitutional law, can arise from the employer's rules, words, or
conduct-by the "common law of [the shop], 36 that is, even by the
public employer's practice in the absence of any rule, if such were
recognized in state law. When, by any of these means, an expectation of
job security is mutually engendered it cannot be revoked. Thus, the
draft's reliance on Vitarelli is misplaced-and misleading.3 7
2. The Doctrinal Emptiness of the Bilateral Agreement/Unilateral
Commitment Distinction
The draft wants to say that a commitment to permanence made in a
bilateral contract-one made by an exchange of promises-is
irrevocable, but one contained in a promulgated employer policy is
revocable. The doctrinal vacuity lies in the fact that the commitment to
job permanence in a bilateral lateral contract need not be made as an
express promise-it may be implied from the circumstances of the
transaction, including the employer's well-established policies and
practices,3 8 just as the draft otherwise recognizes. 39 Doctrinally, it is
indistinguishable from a unilateral commitment.4 °
If the draft's treatment were sound, a public, as much as a private
university, could abrogate the tenure of its incumbent tenured faculty
36. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972).
37. Today, and contrary to the state of constitutional law when Vitarelli was decided, a nonpolicy making public employee cannot be discharged because she voted for a Socialist or thought
minority groups were getting a raw deal. As we will see, not only may a private sector employee be
dismissed for those reasons, the draft approves of the common law's refusal to intervene in those
cases. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 (Discussion Draft 2006).

38. In the case of a bilateral agreement of employment, where the written terms are silent or
where an oral statement is ambiguous, the courts will look to all the surrounding circumstancesthe nature of the particular employment, whether permanence or a fixed duration would be a
common condition in the trade or profession, the special situation of the employee and his or her
actions taken in reliance, and the like. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 cmt. a (1958).
See, e.g., Tucker v. Zapata Indus., Inc., 848 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992).
39.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.02 (Discussion Draft 2006).

40. Note that the Supreme Court of West Virginia is cautious in its requirement of
definiteness, but clear in the nature of the inquiry:
[W]here an employee seeks to establish a permanent employment contract or other
substantial employment right, either through express promises by the employer or by
implication from the employer's personnel manual, policies, or custom and practice,
such claim must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 910, 916 (W. Va. 1992) (emphasis added).
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simply by rescinding its tenure rules. The draft anticipates and attempts
to foreclose that result by treating tenure as an "unusual" case of
bilateral contract rather than as a "unilateral employer commitment":
Although ordinarily a bilateral agreement requires an exchange of
express promises, an offer contemplating acceptance by the
employee's performance, or some other promissory statement by the
employer to which the employee indicates assent, there may be
unusual circumstances where the well-established practices of the
employer indicate conduct manifesting a promise by the employer that
the employee accepts by continuing employment. Such circumstances
are said to be present in the tenure system of modem universities. See
generally Restatement Second, Contracts § 4 and Comment a, at 14.41

This will not do. It is the usual circumstance of both unilateral and
bilateral contracts that "well-established practices of the employer" can
manifest the terms and conditions of employment, 42 and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts' provision cited says exactly that.43 So, too, does
the draft when it says earlier that "typically"-not unusually-"bilateral
agreements involve an exchange of express promises . . . or conduct
manifesting a promise by the employer," 44 i.e., conduct that manifests an
employer's commitment to observe a specific term or condition of
employment.

Academic tenure means that the tenured faculty member cannot be
dismissed except for just cause.45 There is no exchange of promises
between the professor awarded tenure and the institution.4 6 The terms of

41.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.03 (Discussion Draft 2006) (emphasis

added).
42.

See HOWARD A. SPECTER & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND

LITIGATION §§ 1.23, 2.07 (1989) (citing cases where conduct of the employer can be used to
determine the otherwise unstated terms and conditions of employment).
43. The provision cited states in its entirety:
Express and implied contracts. Contracts are often spoken of as express or
implied. The distinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but lies merely
in the mode of manifesting assent. Just as assent may be manifested by words or other
conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be manifested
in language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance. See Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(3),
defining "agreement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a (1981). Nothing here suggests that there is
anything at all unusual in judicial resort to an employer's well-established practice to give meaning
to its obligations.
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.03 (Discussion Draft 2006) (emphasis
added).
45.

MATrHEWW. F1NKIN, THE CASE FORTENURE 3 (1996).

46. Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of PrivateHigherEducation, 65
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the appointment are customarily set out in a set of institutional rules or
policies that may not even be expressly incorporated into the
institution's notice or letter awarding tenure; nevertheless, these are
routinely resorted to by the courts to define the institution's
obligations.4 7 Consequently, the draft's effort to somehow differentiate
tenure as an "unusual" case of bilateral contract in contrast to a
"unilateral employer commitment," only emphasizes the doctrinal
emptiness of the distinction.
3. Vesting
If more is needed, take a look at how the draft treats the question of
vested rights-those unilateral employer commitments that the draft
concedes are insulated from abrogation. Some rights we are told
(severance pay is the one the draft refers to), are capable of vesting and
the draft lays out a set of considerations to guide a court in deciding
what vests and what does not. 48 These include "detrimental reliance" by
the employee and an assessment of the employees' "reasonable
expectations" in the matter.49 (If detrimental reliance need be shown,
many jurisdictions would apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel-a
doctrine that makes virtually no appearance in this draft.5 ° ) Oddly, the
former would bind the employer only as to the studious or "reliant"
employee and not the ignorant or indifferent one. This implicates the
very conundrum the draft lays out to eschew; namely, contract doctrine
in favor of its theory of administrative law estoppel. The latter avoids
that result by resting on the reasonable expectations of the workforce as
a whole, which is fair enough. But the reasonable expectations of the
workforce as a whole would seem equally applicable to a policy

IOWA L. REv. 1120, 1146 (1980).

47. Id. at 1146 & n.120 (citing cases where "Faculty Manuals" were used to define
employment contracts).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.05 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2006).
49. Id.
50. The comment to the section laying out the four categories of contractual job security says
that promissory estoppel "may be applicable." Id. § 3.02 cmt. a. However, the Reporter's Notes
state only that the courts are divided on whether promissory estoppel can be involved when what is
at stake is a promise of an at-will job. Id. § 3.02 cmt. a., reporter's note. Be that as it may,
promissory estoppel can apply both to the abrogation of a unilaterally promulgated benefits policy
and to promises of job security contrary to at-will employment. See Furrer v. Sw. Or. Cmty. Coll.,
103 P.2d 118, 123 (Or. Ct. App. 2004); Enriques v. Nofsiger Mfg. Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183

(D. Colo. 2006). It is puzzling, to put it mildly, that the draft would rest content to make merely
passing mention of a body of law that would seem to call for black-letter treatment. Promissory
estoppel may well be a controverted doctrine vis-A-vis an at-will job, but the draft is not otherwise
reticent about coming down hard on other, equally controversial matters.
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affording job security. And there's the rub: If the draft were to concede
that the reasonable expectations of the workforce could prevent the
abrogation of the employer's commitment to job security, the analogy to
administrative estoppel, upon which the draft's insistence on
abrogability rests, would collapse; for under that doctrine, nothing can
prevent a public agency from abrogating a mere rule of "practice,"
which the draft asserts is all a unilateral commitment to job security is.
In other words, the conditions the draft lays out to govern vesting
are like the jaws of a vice that come within an inch of one another, but
cannot quite close; and the draft does not even try to close them. 5'
Instead, it offers two practical considerations that it takes to support the
result. Let us turn to them.
B. The PracticalJustifications
We are told first that, "[i]t is not reasonable to assume that an
employer intended permanently to circumscribe its operating
policies" 52 which ignores the principle, embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, requiring the courts to construe contracts against
the interest of the drafting party.53 We are told second that "due weight
[should be given] to the employer's interest in maintaining uniform
terms of employment for similarly situated employees., 54 However, this
consideration is of no concern to the draft when it comes to the vesting
of some welfare benefits. The logical outcome of accepting employee
reliance or reasonable expectations there would mean that incumbent
employees would enjoy greater benefits than their recently hired
counterparts, and the draft does not blink at this result. In fact,
employers seem to have no difficulty today in freezing their guaranteed
benefits pension plans vis-d-vis incumbent workers and hiring new
workers under defined contribution plans (sometimes employer noncontributory) or affording them no pension benefits at all.55 Nor are
employers apparently troubled by having the same work done in the
same workplace by both regular and agency workers who work side-by-

51.

As much can be said as well for its treatment of promissory estoppel. See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.02 (Discussion Draft 2006).

52. Id. § 3.05 cmt. a.
206 (1981).

53.
54.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

55.

See Matthew W. Finkin, Bearing the Burdens of Decisions Made by Others: The

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.03 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2006).

CorporateReallocation of Employee Risk in the United States, in PERSPEKTIVEN DER CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE (Ulrich Jiirgens et al. eds., forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Finkin, Bearing the
Burdens].
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side under vastly different wage and benefits policies. 56 Uniformity of
treatment does not seem to be of much concern to employers in these
cases. It is never explained why uniformity of treatment should drive in
the opposite direction when it comes to job security.
The nub of the draft's rationale is contained in the assertion that we
should not assume that employers wish forever to constrain their
flexibility in the matter of discharge, for the draft is candid about why
employers provide these assurances in the first place. "Employers make
such statements in their self-interest because they believe the policies...
will advance productivity, employee welfare, or some other
organizational objective. 5 7 In other words, when employers, acting in
their self interest, decide that fear of job loss might be a better motivator
than job satisfaction, they should be free to disregard their prior
commitments. This logic elides the fact that the loyalty the employer's
policy sought to instill rested upon creating reasonable employee
expectations about how they will be treated in the future. The labor of a
human being is a non-durable good. The individual's dwindling supply
is expended, other opportunities ignored or foregone, at least partly
because of the expectation of fair treatment the employer has
engendered. If expectations of deferred income could estop the employer
from abrogating retroactively its commitment to severance pay, it would
seem much the same should apply in the matter of job security; or, less
strongly, that the draft rather badly needs to explain why it would not, by
reason other than that abrogability better serve an employer's interest.

56. See, e.g., JACKIE KRASAS ROGERS, TEMPS: THE MANY FACES OF THE CHANGING

WORKPLACE 25 (2000) (discussing how temporary workers perform the same tasks as "permanent"
employees, but get unequal compensation and treatment).
57.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2006).

Accord Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1987):
Unquestionably, [the employer] was under no obligations to write and distribute
the employee handbook or the bulletin. Once Springs voluntarily chose to publish the
handbook and bulletin and orally assure the employees that the provisions of those
publications would be followed, there were "strong equitable and social policy reasons
militating against allowing employers to promulgate for their employees potentially
misleading personnel manuals while reserving the right to deviate from them at their
own caprice."
Id. at 454 (quoting Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (N.C. 1985)). "Having
announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee
attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its
promise as illusory ...." Id. (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980)).
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Let us return to the outset of this discussion. We have been told that
job security is an excellent subject for restatement-more on that laterand we have been given three benchmarks against which to measure the
effort: simplicity, doctrinal clarity, and adaptation to social change. Let
us take the measure of this restated rule accordingly.
Simplicity. This seems to be the rule we have been offered: An
employer may not abrogate a commitment to job security made in a
bilateral agreement, even where the obligation is implied from the
employer's conduct (which would seem to include its established
policies), but an employer may abrogate the same commitment when
made as a unilaterally promulgated employer policy. 58
As the draft's treatment of tenure illustrates, the distinction does not
seem all that simple insofar as it requires the court to decide, by
reference to the same employer conduct, whether it forms part of a
bilateral agreement or constitutes merely a "unilateral commitment." In
the event, the value of the rule's simplicity, if it is simple, has to be
determined with reference to its "social values and objectives." '5 9
Doctrinal clarity. From the foregoing, it is enough to observe that
the rule does not flow from any clear or even coherent doctrinal
exposition. The basis for it must rest instead in the need to adapt to
economic or social conditions.
Adaptation to social conditions. This really is the heart of the
matter, but we are incapacitated in addressing it for the simple reason
that the restatement process does not discuss or even advert to what the
conditions are that call for the draft's approach. All we are told is that
employers might no longer see it in their interest to build employee
loyalty and productivity by assuring job security, and that the law should
not be an obstacle to a retroactive restructuring of their policies
accordingly-to favor insecurity and fear of job loss as a better
motivator. Because the draft never discusses the social or economic
realities and trends it is supposedly adapting the law to, we must look
elsewhere. When we do, we learn that for workers of long service, job
security is not being abandoned in wholesale; 60 and we next encounter

58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.03, 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006).
59. Milner, supra note 7, at 797.
60. Ann Huff Stevens, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Trends in
Long-Term Employment in the United States, 1969-2002, at 10-11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11878, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl1878. "[L]ong-term
employment is an important feature of the labor market experience for most U.S. workers." Id. at
11. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that for the period 2003-2005, 3.8 million workers of
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strong arguments that the erosion of job security, when it has occurred,
is short-sighted and destructive, not only of individual lives 6 but
socially and economically as well.62 Others doubtless disagree,
encouraged by the benefits of creative job destruction. This is scarcely
the place to resolve the debate. It is enough to note that the sole social
ground the draft would adapt the law to is strongly contested, and that
the draft resolves the law's role in it without breathing a hint that the
contest exists.
II. DISMISSAL FOR REASONS VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY

The draft surveys what the courts have done with the public
policies they have found to limit an employer's power otherwise to
discharge (or retaliate) against an employee for any reason, no reason, or
even a morally repugnant reason. The draft picks and chooses from
among these, creating four compact categories of protected action: (a)
refusing to do an act that the employee believes, reasonably and in good
faith, to require him or her to violate the law or a code of ethics; (b)
fulfilling a legal obligation; (c) claiming (or refusing to waive) a
workplace benefit or right; and (d) reporting an employer's misconduct
or cooperating in a governmental investigation of it. 63 Each is well
established across a number of jurisdictions. What troubles is the
categorical character of the combination: we are told that "the list of
categories . . . sufficiently constrains the courts' inquiry into public
policy." 64 That is to say, this and only this, so far and no further; but we
three or more years of longevity were displaced in contrast to the 5.3 million displaced in the period
2001-2003, this in a civilian labor market of more than a hundred million. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WORKERS DISPLACEMENT, 2003-2005, USDL 06-1454, at 1 (2006),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/disp.pdf.
See generally Sanford M. Jacoby,
Melting into Air? Downsizing, Job Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195

(2000) (explaining that career-type employment practices continue to be the norm in the U.S. and
that long-term employment relationships remain an important feature of the U.S. labor market).
61. See generally LOUIS UCHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE AMERICAN (2006) (discussing the
negative effects of layoffs on individuals and society).
62. Most of the studies are of lay-offs or "downsizing." See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,
ALAN S. BLINDER & EDWARD N. WOLFF, DOWNSIZING IN AMERICA: REALITY, CAUSES, AND
CONSEQUENCES (2003). But it seems ineluctable, given the draft's rationale, that the abrogation of
job security is intended to and will conduce toward heightened job insecurity. And it is at least
arguable that heightened job insecurity, however it might serve to "discipline" the workforce, also
has negative economic effects. Id. at 22; STEVEN A. HERZBERG, JOHN A. ALIC & HOWARD WAL,
NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY 122 (1998).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 (Discussion Draft 2006).
64. Id. § 4.02 cmt. a. "The approach of §4.02," the Reporter's Note tell us, "side-steps the
controversial issue of how to find public policy by focusing instead on whether the discharge fits
into one of the four categories... " Id. § 4.02 cmt. a, reporter's note.
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are not told why. Nor are the categories without internal difficulty. Let
us take up but three before returning to their preclusive character.
1. Retaliation by the employer for the employee's action: The black
letter rules we have been given are crafted with considerable care and
close attention to detail, as the many illustrative cases set out in the draft
demonstrate.65 The draft would insulate the employee against retaliation
for something he or she has done that he or she can situate in one of the
categories the draft sets OUt. 6 6 But none of these insulate retaliation
against an employee for what another, such as the employee's spouse,
son, or close relative has done. "To retaliate against a man by hurting a
member of his family," Judge Posner reminds us, "is an ancient method
of revenge., 67 It is a recurring fact pattern in the common law of
employment and the courts are at sixes and sevens about what to do
about it. 68 The draft comes down on the side of non-protection, but it
does not tell us why.
2. The employee who reports his or her employer's misconduct: It
serves the public weal, effecting a better enforcement of the law, that
employees not be subject to retaliation for reporting an employer's
conduct which the employee reasonably believes to be unlawful. So far,
so good. Note, however, that the rule insulates the employee from
retaliation only if the report is of conduct attributable to the employer,
not the unlawful conduct of another for which the employer has no
responsibility. 69 Accordingly, it should follow that an employee cannot
be discharged for reporting that a customer raped her,7° for dealing with
the customer was part of her job and his assault on her was part of her
working conditions; but, the draft tells us, she can be discharged for
reporting that her estranged husband raped her, 71 although she could not
be discharged for absenting herself from work in order to cooperate in
his prosecution as that would be the observance of a public obligation, if

65.

See id. § 4.02 cmts. a-g, illus. 1-21 (providing illustrations that are modeled after real

cases).

66. Id. § 4.02.
67. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
68. Compare Gabler v. Holder & Smith, Inc., 11 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000)
(finding no violation of public policy where an employer discharged a wife because her husband
was a whistleblower) with Fortunato v. Office of Stephen M.S. Silston, D.D.S., 856 A.2d 530, 533
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that a discharge of a mother because of her daughter's
contemplation of a lawsuit against the employer was a violation of public policy).
69. Contra Vorpagel v. Maxell Corp. of Am., 775 N.E.2d 658, 659 (I11.
App. Ct. 2002).
70. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. The draft cites Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995), with approval on just
those facts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01 cmt. a, reporter's note
(Discussion Draft 2006).
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she had been subpoenaed.72 As with the limit of protection to only the
employee's action, how the public weal is advanced by this distinction is
not explained. Under the draft's rules, a circus' animal handler who
reports his employer's mistreatment of an animal-a lion-in violation
of federal law, could not be discharged for it. 73 But an employee of a
company providing service to the circus who reports that abuse to
federal authorities could be discharged by his employer for want of that
employer's responsibility. The mistreated lion would be hard pressed to
see the distinction.
3. Asserting a right "arisingfrom employment": It follows from this
rule, as the text and illustrations make clear, that one can be discharged
for asserting a legal right when that right does not "arise from" one's
employment, i.e., adverse job action is permissible because the right
exercised is not job-related.74 By this logic, an employer is free to
regulate all manner of employees' off-duty associations, political
expressions, and other lawful activities because those expressions and
activities are not connected to the job. Some of these activities surely
can be connected to the public weal,75 but the draft would deny the
courts the open-ended power to find society better served by the
insulation of the exercise of a legal right or privilege when it is not
connected to the workplace.76 Accordingly, the draft sees nothing amiss,
of any concern to our once and future common law, were Dr. Vitarelli to
be discharged today because his views on blacks, Jews, the President, or
72. See Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 60 P.3d 1135, 1137 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
73. See Hagan v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 700, 710 (E.D. Va. 2005).
74.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. e (Discussion Draft 2006).

75. See Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996) (discussing the
importance of public-policy-linked conduct); Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Serv., Inc., 125 P.3d
119, 131 (Wash. 2005). The draft rejects Loomis on its facts and adopts the proposition that the
exercise of political free speech outside the workplace is not a matter of public policy because the
courts have not come to a consensus that it is. But see Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75
P.3d 733 (Idaho 2003) (Kidwell, J. dissenting):
Allowing employers to terminate employment based on an individual's
association and speech regarding public issues that may have little or nothing in
connection with the employer's business, invites employers to squelch the association,
speech, and debate so necessary to our system of government, This is particularly true in
the context of the myriad of small Idaho communities with only one or two prominent
employers. Thus, I would hold it against public policy to discharge an employee for
constitutionally-protected political speech or activities regarding a matter of public
concern, provided that such speech or activity does not interfere with the employee's job
performance or the business of the employer.
Id. at 742. A dissent has the capacity to become a majority view over time, depending upon its
power to persuade. But the draft's categorical imperative, fixing the law into only its four rules,
would urge the Idaho Supreme Court to reject Judge Kidwell's opinion in the future because it (and
others) had in the past.
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006).
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the United Nations displeases a corporate manager, howsoever robust
political debate might be thought to contribute to the public weal.
The attempt to cabin protection to job rights-to license retaliation
when the victim's lawful activity has no apparent bearing on job
performance-seems strange and artificial. The draft states, for example,
that as the right of self-defense does not "arise from" employment, its
exercise is not insulated from employer reprisal.77 Does it not seem
strange that an employee who is assaulted by her supervisor cannot be
for reporting him, but she can be discharged for resisting
discharged
78
him?
We are also told that an employee who consults counsel about
compensation wrongfully withheld, perhaps the proceeds of a profitsharing plan, cannot be discharged for that, nor for asserting that right in
court, as these are rights that arise from employment. 79 But we are also
told that if she consults counsel in her capacity as a shareholder over that
company's depletion of the assets that would have gone into her profitsharing plan, she can be discharged. 80 She can also be discharged for
exercising her proxy rights or for joining in a shareholder derivative suit,
because all of these rights are shareholder rights that do not "arise from"
her employment. 8' It is not clear how the distinction would play out in a
company operated as a trust for the employees, 82 or one that is
employee-owned, or one in which stock is held as a result of an
employer-sponsored stock purchase plan. One is hard pressed to see why
it should make a difference that the employee sought to protect her
interest in the company's long-term profitability by purchasing shares in
the open market and exercising her rights as a shareholder to protect her
job instead of holding them as an employee-owner or via an employersponsored plan. In a case of discharge because employee-shareholders
refused to vote their stock as management dictated, the Supreme Court
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. e, illus. 13 (Discussion Draft
2006).
78. In West Virginia, however, the discharge of an employee who faced "lethal imminent
danger" or, in California, one who is "backed into a corner by his attacker, with no means of
escape" would or might be actionable, respectively, as a violation of public policy. Feliciano v. 7Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 715-16 (W. Va. 2001); Escalante v. Wilson's Art Studio, Inc., 135
Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). It appears that the draft rejects these scenarios because
they fall outside the "four categories." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt.

e, illus. 13 (Discussion Draft 2006).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. e (Discussion Draft 2006).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 4.02 cmt. e, illus. 15.
82. Farlow v. Adams, 474 So. 2d 53, 58 (Ala. 1985) (protecting employees of a company on
trust law and employment contract principles without addressing the "arising from employment"
issue).
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of Virginia put the question as "whether this employer can, with absolute
immunity, discharge these employees in retaliation for the proper
exercise of rights as stockholders, a reason which has nothing to do with
the employees' job performance., 83 The answer it gave was a
categorical "no." This the draft rejects.
There is more. The draft tells us that nothing in public policy
should speak to the discharge of an employee for marrying someone
contrary to a manager's dictate. 84 Dismissal might be the consequence
of a legitimate anti-nepotism rule 85 or it might be an act of jealous
vengeance,86 but the draft maintains that the courts should have no
business drawing any such distinction. As the at-will rule allows an
employer to discharge for a morally squalid reason, and as one's right to
marry does not "arise from" one's employment, we are to content
ourselves with the proposition that in the eyes of the law the loss of
one's job is a price one can be made to pay for love.
Love, as a recent discussion of German law puts it, is a private
thing-Liebe ist Privatsache.87 In Germany, the judge-made law
prohibits employers from interfering in the private lives of their
employees absent some supervening legitimate business reason. 88 But
the draft tells us that such is not, and should not be public policy here.
One might not be distressed to see that marriage is not insulated from the
vengeful action of a jealous manager as a matter of public policy were it
to be protected as a matter of privacy. But as freedom of intimate
association is not recognized anywhere in the common law of privacy it
will make no appearance in this Restatement. It could seek shelter under
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which the draft tells us is

83. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 800 (Va. 1985). The employees had
also alleged that the employer's action violated corporate and securities law, but the gravamen of
the wrong, as the court saw it, was less that, than the bank's seeking "to influence the exercise of
protected shareholder rights by bringing pressure to bear on the vulnerable employee relationship..
[T]he employment-at-will rule does not protect the defendants from such conduct." Id.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. e, illus. 11 (Discussion Draft
2006).
85. See Bulman v. Safeway, Inc., 27 P.3d 1172, 1177 (Wash. 2001).
86. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979, 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Barrett v.
Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 73-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
87. Tina Kolle & Olaf Deinert, Liebe ist Privatsache: Grenzen einer arbeitsvertraglichen
Regelung zwischenmenschlicher Beziehungen [Love is a Private Thing - Borders of a WorkContractual Regulation of Interhuman Relations], [AuR] 177 (2006) (F.R.G.).
88. See Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in
Western Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.577, 583 (2002) [hereinafter Finkin, Menschenbild];
Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away From Work, 66 LA. L. REv. 945, 948 (2006). For a jurisprudential

basis of the law, see generally Finkin, Menschinbild, supra, comparing the development of legal
attitudes towards workers' personal rights in German and American law.
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instinct even in an employment held at-will. 89 If, as the draft maintains,
good faith means that one cannot be fired for doing one's job, fair
dealing might mean one shouldn't be discharged for engaging in a
lawful activity that has no significant relationship to the doing of one's
job. 90 But the draft's treatment of the covenant precludes that possibility
as well. And so, the exercise of any lawful right that does not "arise
from" employment-no matter how beneficial to civil society and
harmless to any legitimate business interest-is denied any prospect of
the common law's protection.

We have been told that public policy as a limit on retaliatory acts is
an excellent subject for restatement, and we have been given three
benchmarks against which to measure the effort. Let us take them up.
Simplicity. As with the distinction we are given between bilateral
contracts and unilateral commitments, the four canonical categories
appear to be simple; but they, too, leave room for dispute. 9 1 And even
so, the value of simplicity has to be measured against other ends.
Doctrinal clarity. Interestingly, the approach here differs radically
from that taken to contractual job security. That section attempts to
cobble together some doctrinal ground. This section makes no such
effort. We are told only that some courts have searched for an explicit
grounding of public policy in positive or constitutional law and that
others have been more "open-ended" in weighing how the public weal is
or might be affected by the employer's action. 92 We are then told that
the draft rejects both of these. 93 Instead, "it follows the courts that
require that a successful claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy fall within the list of categories enumerated . . . ,94 It
"side-steps the controversial issue of how to find public policy by
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.06 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006).

90. See Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 295 & n.74 (Alaska 2004) (dictum suggesting
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could well encompass the protection of employee
privacy).

91. The draft tells us that absence from work for a valid personal reason, e.g., seeking medical
aid as the result of an automobile accident, implicates no public policy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. c, illus. 7 (Discussion Draft 2006). It should follow that one could
be discharged for leaving the job to seek medical assistance, for example, because of a severe
intestinal attack. If the employee absenting himself were a food service worker, would the
employer's order to remain at work and the ensuing discharge for the employee's refusal to obey, be
actionable nevertheless? See Silver v. CPC-Sherwood Manor, Inc., 84 P.3d 728, 729 (Okla. 2004).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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focusing instead on whether the discharge fits into one of [these] four
categories . . . . 95 In other words, the draft takes an operaticlal
approach: Just as time is whatever is measured by a clock, public policy
is whatever these-and only these-four categories capture, because
they represent a current consensus of the courts that have accepted a role
for public policy as a limit on the at-will rule howsoever derived. The
common denominator circa 2006 thus defines both the current content
and the future limit of the public good.
This seems difficult to reconcile with the forward-looking
justification offered for the restatement process: to adapt the law to
changed-and changing-social conditions. That purposive element
could be dealt with by adding a fifth category, to allow intervention
when the circumstances of the discharge fall into none of the preceding
categories but so implicate the public weal as to justify it. Alas, that
would be the very "open ended' approach that some courts have taken
and that the draft rejects. Alternatively, the draft could add a fifth
operational category allowing for intervention when a future class of
cases falling into none of those set out has achieved a judicial consensus.
But such a black-letter rule would lack simplicity and clarity as the
courts would have to look elsewhere to find what the law is.
Ironically, the draft need not be expressly preclusive of the growth
of law: it could anticipate and indeed welcome new categories of public
policy-just as the Restatement (Second) of Torts anticipated and
welcomed new categories of privacy protection-and still achieve its
preclusive end. The judicial reception of the privacy Restatement's
operationalism supplies a sobering study in legal stultification
foreshadowing the influence the instant draft's approach to public policy
is most likely to have. Let us look briefly at it.
The draft restating privacy law was in the hands of William Prosser,
who, in 1967, asked that the draft be held in abeyance pending the
elaboration of constitutional doctrine by the United States Supreme
Court.96 In 1974, his successor deemed the matter ripe; the section was
published in 1977. 97 Much as the instant draft, it sets out four categories98
of privacy invasion about which the courts had come to agreement.
Unlike the instant draft, the official comment saw these as nonpreclusive. 99 "Other forms" of actionable privacy invasion, the

95.
96.

Id.
Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) TORTS (1977).

97.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) TORTS (1977).

98.
99.

Id. § 652A cmt. c.
Id.
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Comment said, "may still appear." 1 Apropos of this, it adverted to
evolving constitutional law and other references to a right to privacy
made in connection with the rise of computerized dossiers and the
like. 10 1 These "may give rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort
liability for invasion of privacy listed in this Section or the establishment
the
of new forms. Nothing in this Chapter is intended to 1exclude
02
possibility of future developments in the tort law of privacy." ,
Despite the explosion in privacy invasive technology and its
deployment in the workplace, despite the growth, modest, to be sure, in
privacy-protective constitutional law, there has been no responsive
development in the common law. "The [four] categories have become
canonical. In court after court, if what is presented is not one of the
litany of four, it is not privacy" 103-which, incidentally, is what makes
the proposal to restate the common law of employee privacy today so
very pointless"Y--and which should come as no surprise. An operational
approach, for the want of a theory, is incapable of extension or
refinement. When a case not contained in any of its categories is
presented a court is left bereft of guidance on how to decide. The
autonomic reaction is accordingly to reject the case as presenting an
inauthentic issue-there of privacy, here of public policy-precisely
because it is not contained in any of the categories the court has been
given. ° 5
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy,American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 221, 259 (1996).
104. The most pressing issues of employee privacy concern job screening and testing;
workplace monitoring; the collection, dissemination, and use of data; and all manners of control of
employees on the job and off. In virtually none of these does the common law of tort play a
significant role. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY INEMPLOYMENT LAW (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing how the common law of employee privacy is limited). In any event, it probably is the
case that workable solutions to these issues have far better call upon legislative and, perhaps,
follow-on administrative action than on tort litigation.
105. Thus far, only a partial first draft on workplace privacy has appeared. Though a reformist
end is quickly apparent, the draft inevitably is drawn back by the gravitational pull of what spins off
from, a tort concerned with offensive employer behavior, not employee privacy. Id. To take but
one example, the draft sees no privacy issue to be posed-none at all-by video surveillance of
work stations open to view because, as employees are aware that they are being observed, they
"have the opportunity to alter their behavior in response." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 5.03 cmt. h, illus. 7 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005). In contrast, German law has a well
developed theory of privacy that includes one's right to control one's presentation of oneself to
others (das Recht am eigenes Bild-literally "the right to one's own picture"). See Finkin,
Menschenbild, supra note 88, at 582 & n.25. In German law, the installation of these cameras must
be agreed upon with the works council, the employees' shop floor representative, because of the
threat they pose to the right of self-presentation. The very fact that one must alter one's conduct
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Adaptation to social conditions. Just as in the case of contractual
job security, we cannot evaluate whether what we are offered is a better
adaptation to social conditions because it does not tell us what the
conditions are that call for this approach. The foreclosing of any growth
in the law is surely in need of some explanation; even the categories we
are given call for a reasoned exposition. We are told, for example, that
an employee's action as a shareholder of the employing company must
be distinguished categorically from her role as an employee. 106 This at a
time when the role of employees in corporate governance is being
broadly debated,'0 7 when strong arguments have been mounted that
employees should be regarded as stakeholders in the employing
enterprise. 10 8 This is not the place to begin to attempt to resolve the
debate. It is enough to note that the draft charts a course that comes
down hard on one side of it without breathing a hint that a debate exists.
III. "AN EXCELLENT SUBJECT FOR RESTATEMENT"?

The 1923 Committee cautioned that highly contentious issues of
"social or industrial or any other policy," the legal disposition of which
is not generally accepted-such as "a method of improving the relations
between capital and labor"--are not suitable for restatement.' 0 9 In the
Committee's view the legal changes a restatement should propose
"would be either in the direction of simplifying the law where it is
because one is being observed works an infringement of one's right of privacy. What the draft
offers as the basis of escaping a privacy analysis in the United States, for want of a theory,
constitutes the gravamen of the privacy infringement in German law.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 cmt. e, illus. 15 (Discussion Draft
2006). Under the proposed Restatement, an employee fired for taking part in a shareholder
derivative suit cannot claim wrongful termination because a shareholder's right does not "arise from
employment." Id.
107. See generally PERSPEKTIVEN DER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Ulrich JOrgens et al. eds.,

forthcoming 2006) (demonstrating the worldwide debate on the role of employees in corporate
governance); RICHARD MITCHELL, ANTHONY O'DONNELL & IAN RAMSAY, SHAREHOLDER VALUE
AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE

LAW AND LABOUR LAW (Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 128, 2005) (discussing
employee ownership and employees roles in corporate governance); PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING
PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT

IT 146-78 (1999) (discussing corporate govemance and the shift in the balance of power between
employers and employees); Symposium, Employees and CorporateGovernance, 22 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Symposium] (discussing the contested and controversial issue of
corporate governance).
108. See generally Symposium, supra note 107 (discussing employees as stakeholders).
109. American Law Institute, Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
Organizationfor the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute reprinted in THE AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY

23-24

(1973)

[hereinafter 1923 REPORT].
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unnecessarily complex or in the direction of the better adaptation of the
details of the law to the accomplishment of ends generally admitted to be
desirable."110
The extent to which a rule is grounded in a generally accepted end
vel non has been a persistent conundrum in the restatement process.'1
Some aspects of the instant draft do reflect the center of gravity after
decades of change in the at-will rule; most jurisdictions do accept the
principle that an employer's policies affording job security can be
contractually binding; most accept the idea that public policy can limit
an employer's power to discharge.' 12 But the follow-on issues addressed
in the draft are both critical and controversial, yet the draft comes down
on them, categorically.
This incites two closely related inquiries: First, whether, given the
velocity of economic and social change, controverted aspects of
employment relations law are any more meet for restatement today than
in 1923. And second, given the trajectory of legal change, whether the
direction the draft takes can be justified nevertheless.
A. The Velocity of Change
The historian Simon Middleton, writing of Colonial New York,
reminds us that

110. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). It prefaced that admonition thusly:
[T]here can be little doubt that the law is not always well adapted to promote what the
preponderating thought of the community regards as the needs of life. The limitation on
the character of any reformation of the law by an organization formed to carry out the
public obligation of the legal profession to improve the law is reasonably definite.
Changes in the law which are, or which would, ifproposed,become a matter of general
public concern and discussion should not be considered, much less set forth, in any
restatement of the law such as we have in mind. Changes which do not fall under the
ban of this limitation, and which will carry out more efficiently ends generally accepted
as desirable are within the province of the restatement to suggest.
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
Ill.
Assuming that there is now a need for a restatement of the common law in the
form of a system of new generalizations from the welter of individual decisions, is the
Institute sufficiently taking into account the recent variations already evidenced in court
decisions and also the social mores and business practices that are already ripe for new
variations that must inevitably take place? The answer to this is easy; most certainly the
answer is No.
Arthur Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 IOWA L.
REv. 19, 27 (1929) (emphasis added).
112.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (Discussion Draft 2006); 82 AM.

JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge§ 53, at 645 & n.l (2006).
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work has ever been more than a material and technical pursuit bounded
by considerations of location and resource. The organization of
productive capacities and employment of skills is also a social process
that requires the justification of authority and interests in terms of
norms and expectations that change over time, norms and expectations
that are only fully intelligible when set within
113 the wider context of
contemporary political and legal discourses.
In a scant two centuries, the United States moved from an
overwhelmingly rural people in an agricultural economy to an urban
people in an industrial economy to an increasingly suburban people in a
service economy; participation rates in the labor market, especially by
women and minorities, changed radically; employment shifted from
small to large, highly bureaucratic enterprises, from precariousness and
high turnover to longer job tenures, and then to ever greater labor market
segmentation; union density rose from perhaps 10% before the Wagner
Act to 37% in the post-War period then to decline to under 8% today;
114
corporate welfare policies suffered birth, death, and transfiguration;
and a good deal more.
These drastic changes were followed by equally strong shifts in
legal discourse, albeit with the law's customary lag timellS: from the
Colonial Period, which was a mixture of free labor, mercantilismwhere stringent local regulation was imposed upon free labor (in a labor
market that included a significant component of unfree labor as well, not
abolished until 1865), and the law of master and servant, the latter
regnant from the Federal Period up through the first half of the
nineteenth century (parts of which are with us still) in which the
respective rights and obligations of the parties were set by judge-made
law, to the judiciary's more wholehearted embrace of laissez-faire in the

113. SIMON MIDDLETON, FROM PRIVILEGES TO RIGHTS: WORK AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK CITY 3 (2006).
114. See generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE

THE NEW DEAL (1997) (describing the evolution of the U.S. economy).
115.
What must be grasped is that change [at the beginning and end of the twentieth century]
was discontinuous. It did not simply intensify existing practices and trends. It was as
much qualitative as quantitative, and at both ends of the century eventually reconfigured
the nation's economy and society. Whatever the pace of revolutionary change, however,
the break with the past is never clean, immediate, or total. Americans therefore lived
with a tension between what their nation was and what it was becoming. Social,
economic, and demographic transformation, as is often the case, proved swifter than
intellectual regrouping. Americans confronted a transforming world with old ideas
whose underpinningshad been exploded.
MICHAEL B. KATZ & MARK J. STERN, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: WHAT AMERICA WAS AND WHAT IT
IS BECOMING 5 (2006) (emphasis added).
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last quarter of the nineteenth century, captured by the at-will rule, to the
legislative reaction to the asperities of the at-will rule, commencing with
the New Deal and accelerating ever since, on to the realization by the
judiciary that the social and economic situation of the last quarter of the
nineteenth century should not drive the law of employment in the last
quarter of the twentieth, signaled, if a signpost were needed, by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1974.116
Obviously, an effort to restate the common law of employment
from cases generated by a largely agricultural workforce would have had
little bearing upon the industrial workforce two generations later; nor
would the law fashioned out of those industrial conditions necessarily
have been responsive to a white collar workforce in bureaucratized
service settings two generations on. If this project had been undertaken
in 1973,117 it would certainly have had to adopt the then prevailing
position that a commitment to job permanence had to be supported by
additional consideration other than acceptance of the job,'18 and to
announce, were it to adopt the same operationalism it applies here, that
the categories of a discharge wrongful by reason of public policy were
limited to two-the refusal to do an unlawful act119 and the making of a
further extension then being
workers' compensation claim' 2 0-any

116. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,551 (N.H. 1974).
117. This benchmark was chosen not only because it was the year preceding Monge v. Beebe
Rubber, but was the year in which this writer first assumed to profess labor law.
118. At that time, a contract of permanence assuring that discharge would only be for just
cause was considered to be so unusual, that additional consideration was required independent of
the services performed to support it. Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity and Duration of
Contract Purporting to be for Permanent Employment, 60 A.L.R. 3D 226, 244-45 (1974). The
doctrine was in decline a decade later.
The law is not ordinarily concerned with the adequacy of consideration. Commitments
to permanence in employment are less unusual today than in the decades before the
Second World War; indeed, the history of employer policy from the turn of the century
until the present is characterized by a shift from treating employees as expendable to
inducing long service. Thus, the "second consideration" rule produces anomalous results
and a pattern of conflicting decisions on just what such adequate consideration is, when
the thrust of the inquiry is better directed at deciding what the terms of the contract are.
SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 42, § 2.12, at 196-97.
119. The then leading case was Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Liability for Discharging At-Will
Employee for Refusing to Participatein, or for Disclosing,Unlawful or Unethical Acts of Employer
or Coemployees, 9 A.L.R. 4TH 329, 336 (1981) [hereinafter Wakefield, Unethical Acts of
Employer].
120. The "landmark decision," according to the annotator, was Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas
Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), quoted in Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for
Dischargefrom Employment in Retaliationfor Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.
4TH 1221, 1224 (1984).
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contested terrain. 121 Yet into this vortex of economic, social, and legal
change, the American Law Institute would now codify when employees
are to be secure in their jobs and when they might be able to turn to the
courts for relief when they claim their employers have acted against
them contrary to the public interest.
These subjects might be meet for restatement if the positions staked
out were rooted in the demonstrable direction of social and economic
change. But the draft makes no effort to persuade us that that is so-nor
could it.
B. The Trajectory of Change
The project is at pains largely to ignore legislation-save insofar as
the adequacy of relief under a protective law can be taken to preclude an
action at common law. But the employment relationship is increasingly
caught up in a skein of legislation, much growing out of the very
inadequacy of the common law. When one looks at the trajectory of
legal change as a whole, looking at the social conditions of the
employment relationship from the end of the Second World War to the
present, one cannot escape the bald fact that the ideological basis for the
nineteenth century's commitment to laissez-faire has been thoroughly
undermined. Nevertheless, the draft concludes that some courts have
gone too far and have been insufficiently appreciative of employer
prerogative. Maybe so. But upon what basis is that judgment predicated?
Presumably, the judgment of "an organization formed to carry out
the public obligation of the legal profession"' 22 should be grounded in
what it knows best, i.e., the better understanding of legal doctrine.
Indeed, the American Law Institute was created in response to the
challenge to doctrinal formalism mounted by Legal Realism--or so we
have been told' 23 -its work rooted in the idea that doctrine was not mere

words on paper, putty in the hands of those who apply it, but had
meaning, that could generate predictable and desirable results. The rules
under discussion here are an exercise in Legal Realism. 124
121. For examples of contested discharge of at-will employees see, e.g., Theresa Ludwig Kruk,
Annotation, Liabilityfor DischargeofAt- Will Employeefor In-Plant Complaintsor Efforts Relating
to Working Conditions Affecting Health or Safety, 35 A.L.R. 4TH 1031 (1985); Wakefield,
Unethical Acts of Employer, supra note 119; R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Dischargefrom Private
Employment on Ground ofPolitical Views or Conduct, 51 A.L.R. 2D 742 (1957).
122. 1923 REPORT, supra note 109, at 23.
123. Mitchell Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement as
Transitionalto Codification, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1367, 1368-70 (1934).
124. This would come as no surprise to our observer. Id. at 1368 (citing Roscoe Pound, The
Callfora Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REv. 697, 708 (1931) ("To [the new juristic realists]

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss1/1

26

Finkin: Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment)
20061

SHORING UP THE CITADEL

The section on job security claims to be grounded in doctrine when,
as we have seen, it manhandles doctrine in order to achieve a specific
end-to permit employers to free themselves of what they might
conceive in hindsight to be an undesirable commitment to job security.
The section on public policy eschews any doctrinal grounding. It takes
four propositions operationally to define both the current content and the
outer limit of judicial intervention; anything more receptive to social
change would be the "open-ended" approach the draft rejects. So much
for the states as laboratories of legal experiment; so much for the
capacity of the law to evolve.
There are surely precedents for a Restatement staking out a position
intended to give direction to legal change, a provision that opts for the
"better" result even if not the then prevailing one. The classic case is of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the subject of
William Prosser's equally classic articles (which give rise to the title of
this piece) that opted for a seller's strict liability to consumers or users of
a product even when they had not purchased the product from the seller,
i.e., who were not in privity with the seller. 125 The citadel of privity was
under assault and the defense bar mounted a vigorous counter-attack
asserting that as only a minority of jurisdictions had abandoned privity
the ALI would be exceeding its authority by endorsing its
abandonment.126 The ALI was unpersuaded. 127 The number of
jurisdictions didn't matter, the ALI's then Director argued, for the
section represented the weight of opinion "as to the direction that the law
was taking."' 128 It should have been obvious to almost any sentient being
at the time that the doctrine of privity made no modem sense.
The provisions discussed here are to an opposite effect. The
nineteenth century citadel of at-will employment is falling. That should
be plain for all to see. What will replace it will have to respond to the
unfolding economic and social circumstances of this century. The draft's
response is not to anticipate the direction of that change, but to shore the
29
citadel up. 1
the significant feature of law is as a body of devices for enabling business and industry to achieve
certain purposes.").
125. See generally William Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MiNN. L. REV. 791 (1965); William Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel,69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960) (discussing section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
126. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 149 (1969).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. One of the deans of the arbitral profession recently called for the United States to enact an
unfair dismissal law, as has so much of the world. George Nicolau, Address at the National
Academy of Arbitration Annual Meeting: Is It Time for a National Unfair Dismissal Statute? (May
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IV. "A RESTATEMENT WILL BE INFLUENTIAL."
It is unlikely that the Texas courts will abandon their refusal to
accept that the public weal might be implicated in an employee's
discharge for other than an actual refusal to do a criminal act,130 or that
California's courts will curtail the broad protections the state's
131
constitution affords individuals vis-A-vis private centers of power.
The influence of a Restatement will most likely be felt in jurisdictions
whose law is relatively undeveloped either because too few cases have
yet been presented or because the courts are divided on how to approach
them. For them, the simplicity and clarity of a Restatement's rules ease a
burdened judiciary of the struggle of decision; the imprimatur of the
Institute substitutes for independent thought-just as the history of the
judicial reception of the Restatement on privacy evidences. That this
Restatement might prove influential is no cause for celebration.
Are we really so confident that an employer should be able to
revoke its commitment to fair dismissal with impunity? 132 That an
employer should be able to discharge an employee because she resisted
her ex-husband's rape? 133 Or because she sought to protect her job by
voting her stock against a merger that would line executive pockets but
be disastrous to the workforce? 134 So very confident, in fact, that we
should welcome the legal establishment's categorical assertion that it
would be error for a court to reach a different result?
Obviously, much work needs to be done in the reform of American
employment law; and the American Law Institute is surely well situated
to play an important role in it. But restating a body of law much in flux,
some of it immoral, seems particularly perverse. Justice Jackson once

27, 2006). A prominent management lawyer demurred, pointing to the evolution of the law of
discharge to be wrongful as a matter of public policy. Jack Gallagher, Address at the National
Academy of Arbitration Annual Meeting: The Case Has Not Been Made for a National Unfair
Dismissal Statute (May 27, 2006) ("Such evolution is the tradition of our common law system, and
is sure to continue. Some states may lead the way in responding to new issues as they arise, and the
experience of these states will be instructive. The most compelling rationales will naturally spread
to other states. I submit that this evolution has worked well to date."). Whether it has worked well
or not is beside the point because, to the draft, no new responses are to be desired.
130. See, e.g., The Ed Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, No. 03-1101, 2006 WL 1043081, at *3 (Tex.
Apr. 21, 2006).
131. See, e.g., Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
132. Contra Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (Ill. 1999).
133. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see Imes v. City of Asheville,
594 S.E.2d 397, 398,400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the Plaintiff, who was fired for being a
victim of domestic violence, failed to allege a cause of action for wrongful termination).
134. Contra Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 799-800 (Va. 1985).
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observed that we avoid certain ends by avoiding certain beginnings. 135
This is one.

135.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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